CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -JUSTICIABILITY

A NONJUSTICIABLE
100 S. Ct. 533 (1979).

TION:

-TREATY

TERMINA-

CONTROVERSY-Goldwater v.

Carter,

Whether the constitutional authority to terminate a treaty rests
with the President alone, or is shared with the Congress, is a sharply
contested issue among commentators. 1 President Carter's unilateral
notice of intention to terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China has been
acclaimed a "stroke of grand strategy," 2 and condemned as "unconstitutional and illegal." 3 Regardless of which view is correct, the Su-

preme Court of the United States, in Goldwater v. Carter,4 has decided that the issue presents a political, nonjusticiable question.
In an address to the nation on December 15, 1978, President
Carter announced that on January 1, 1979, the United States would
terminate diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and "recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of
China." 5 This announcement culminated efforts begun under the
Nixon administration to normalize diplomatic relations with the

1 The controversy stems from the fact that the Constitution expressly delineates the roles
played by the legislative and executive branches in treaty formation, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl.2, but is mute on the mechanism for treaty termination. Compounding the problem is the
fact that both branches otherwise enjoy substantial constitutional authority in the area of foreign
affairs. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy ....");id. cl. 2 ("He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . . ");id. art. II, § 3 ("[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ....")and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
("The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.") with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2 (Senate granted power to
consent before a treaty can become binding); id. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers .. . shall be
vested in the Congress ....");id. art. I, § 8, cl.11 (Power to declare war vested in the
Congress); id. art I, § 8, cl.3 ('[Congress shall have the Power] [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations ....").
An analysis of constitutional authority to terminate treaties lies beyond the scope of this
note. For a detailed discussion of that topic, see Comment, Treaty Termination by the President
Without Senate or Congressional Approval: The Case of the Taiwan Treaty, 33 S.W. L.J. 729
(1979), and authorities cited therein.
2 Kennedy, Normal Relations with China: Good Law, Good Policy, 65 A.B.A.J. 194
195
(1979).
3 Goldwater, Treaty Termination Is a Shared Power, 65 A.B.A.J. 198, 198 (1979).
4 100 S. Ct. 533, 536 (1979).
5 United States Statement, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the
People's Republic of China, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DoG. 2266, 2266 (Dec. 18, 1978).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:243

People's Republic of China.6 In addition, the President announced
that the Republic of China would be notified concurrently that the
United States intended to terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty
7
pursuant to its terms.
On December 22, 1978, Senator Barry Goldwater, joined by
twenty-five fellow congressmen, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the President's
authority to terminate the Treaty without prior legislative consent.8
Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged a violation of Section 26 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978, 9 the "Dole-Stone
Amendment," which provides "[i]t is the sense of the Congress that
there should be prior consultation between the Congress and the
executive branch on any proposed policy changes affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954." 10 According to Senator Goldwater, the President had acted without the prescribed "prior consultation.""

I

It was during President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China in 1972 that the
"Shanghai Communique" was released, declaring a goal of normalization of diplomatic relations
between the United States and the People's Republic of China. Joint Statement, Shanghai:Joint
Communique, 8 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 473, 475 (Feb. 27, 1972). By implication, one
of the conditions precedent to that goal was the termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty
between the United States and the Republic of China. Id. at 474.
7 Article X of the Treaty, which had been negotiated in the aftermath of the Korean War as
a security measure against possible future military threats from the People's Republic of China,
provides that "[ejither Party may terminate . . . one year after notice has been given to the
other Party." Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954, United
States-Republic of China on Taiwan, 6 U.S.T. 433, 437, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
8 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412, at 3
(D.D.C., filed Dec. 22, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief]. For an enumeration of the party plaintiffs, see Comment, supra note 1, at n.3-5.
9 The International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, 92 Stat. 730
(1978). See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 8.
10The International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, 92 Stat. 730, 746
(1978). The President had signed the Act just a few months prior to his address. See Goldwater
v. Carter, No. 79-2246, slip op. at 5 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979), vacated and remanded to
dismiss complaint, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979). It must be noted, however, that legislation couched in
terms of "it is the sense of" is not binding on the President. See CONG. REc. S7048 (daily
ed. June 6, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Jr.).
11 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 8. The defendants disputed this allegation and filed affidavits detailing the alleged consultation. See Declaration of
Richard Holbrooke in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment. See also Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 7.
Due to the nonmandatory nature of the Dole-Stone amendment, the district court was
unable to determine the degree of consultation required to satisfy its terms. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. June 6, 1979), reopened at 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.
1979). For this reason, those counts of plaintiffs' complaint alleging injury under the amendment
were dismissed. Id.
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Although the district court expressed its belief that the power to
12 it
terminate treaties is shared by the President and Congress,
reasoned that since the suit involved derivative constitutional rights of
individual legislators, the "political arena" was the appropriate forum
for vindication. 13 To bypass the political arena and to achieve standing, the district court ruled that legislation, dissenting from the President's action and adopted by the Senate or Congress as a whole, was
required to establish the requisite injury in fact.14 "In the absence of
any injury to the institution as a whole, the individual legislators . ..
[could not] claim a derivative injury." 15 Accordingly, the absence of
such legislation was deemed to preclude standing. 16
In reaching this posture, the court was cognizant of legislation
then pending in the Senate that could evidence that body's "prerogaIn direct response, 19
tive to act," 17 and therefore confer standing.'
the Senate as a whole voted to adopt Resolution 15 on the same day
as the district court ruling. 20 The Resolution maintained "[tihat it is
the sense of the Senate that approval of the United States Senate is

12

Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412, slip op. at 10 (D.D.C. June 6, 1979), reopened at 481

F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979).
13 Id. at 8.
14 Id. at 9-10, 11-12. For a detailed analysis of the standing issue, compare Comment, supra
note 1, at 748-54, and Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 951-56 (D.D.C. 1979) with
Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246, slip op. at 1-16 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979) (Wright, C.J.,
concurring).
15 Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412, slip op. at 10 (D.D.C. June 6, 1979), reopened at 481

F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979). In this respect, the district court adopted the rationale of Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that to the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so too is the power of each congressman, since his office confers the right to participate in the exercise of the powers of the institution. Id. at 435-36.
"I Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412, slip op. at 10 (D.D.C. June 6, 1979), reopened at 481
F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 9 n.13. See S. Res. 15, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S220 (daily ed. Jan.
18, 1979) (introduced by Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Jr.); S. Res. 10, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REC. S209 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1979) (introduced by Sen. Dole): S. Con. Res. 22, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S219 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979) (introduced by Sen. Goldwater).
19 The Senate was fully aware of the implications of its vote with regard to the district
court's June 6th Order. Prior to the vote, Senator Goldwater explained the Order to the Senate,
and provided each senator with a summary thereof. 125 CONG. REC. S7033-7035 (daily ed. June
6, 1979). During the debate on Resolution 15, passages from the Order were read by Senator
Church. Id. at S7058.
20 Resolution 15 was adopted by a vote of 59 to 35. See 125 CONG. REC. S7038-7039 (daily
ed. June 6, 1979). However, because the Senate could not agree whether the Resolution should
have retrospective effect, so as to embrace President Carter's actions with regard to the 1954
Mutual Defense Treaty, no final action was taken. Id. at S7052-7053. The Resolution again was
debated while the case was before the court of appeals, but again no final action was taken. Id.
at S16683-16692 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979).
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required to terminate any Mutual Defense Treaty between the
21
United States and another nation."
On the plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the prior judgment in
light of the Resolution, 22 the district court opined that the vote
"evidence[d] at least some congressional determination to participate
in the process whereby a mutual defense treaty is terminated." 23 In
granting the motion, the court judged that the plaintiffs had perfected
their derivative right to be consulted and to vote on termination of
the Treaty, and therefore had established standing. 24 The court
further determined that in view of the Resolution, the case did not
present a nonjusticiable political question, but a power struggle "between the two political branches in a posture suitable for judicial resolution." 25
26
The district court ruled on the merits in Goldwater v. Carter
and concluded that the constitutional power to terminate a treaty was
not vested solely in either political branch. Analogizing to the constitutional process of treaty formation, 27 the court envisioned treaty
21 S. Res. 15, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC, S220 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979) (introduced by Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Jr.). But see S. Rep. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REC. S7014 (daily ed. June 6, 1979) (Senate Resolution 15, as amended by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, recognized constitutional authority on behalf of the President to terminate treaties containing termination clauses like that of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty).
22 Rule 59(a) provides in part:
On a motion for a new trial [served not later than 10 days after entry of judgment]
in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). The motion was granted on October 17, 1979. Goldwater v. Carter, 481
F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979), vacated and remanded to dismiss complaint, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979).
23 Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 954 (D.D.C. 1979), revd, No. 79-2246 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 30, 1979), vacated and remanded to dismiss complaint, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979).
24 Id.

at 955.

25 Id. at 958. According to the court, the case did not require a determination of " 'the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of [the foreign affairs power, which] is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision.' " Id. at 957 (quoting Baker v, Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
n.31 (1962) (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)). To the contrary,
the court believed that the case presented the antecedent question whether the President had
acted within the bounds of executive authority, the resolution of which clearly falls within the
court's responsibility to interpret the Constitution. Id. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803).
26 481 F. Supp. 949, 962 (DD.C. 1979), rev'd, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979),
vacated and remanded to dismiss complaint, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979).
27 Id. The process of treaty formation follows a tripartite model: the President negotiates
terms with the other party; the Senate consents to ratification; and, the President communicates
such ratification to the other party. See Comment, supra note 1, at 733-34. But see L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 130 (1972) (function of Senate is to give consent to
ratification; President actually ratifies).
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termination as a series of complementary acts grounded in the separation of powers doctrine. 2 8 The executive function was recognized to
embrace the initial policy determinations and negotiations regarding
the question whether a treaty should be terminated, and final communication of termination to the other party.2 9 However, since a
treaty is part of the "supreme Law of the Land," 30 and since the
Congress is vested with "All legislative Powers" under the Constitution, 3 1 the actual decision whether to terminate was deemed to be
a legislative function. 32 Accordingly, the district court held that the
President must receive either two-thirds approval by the Senate, or
majority approval by both houses of Congress, before he constitutionally could give notice of treaty terminationa 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed the district court holding. 34 In the
opinion of the appellate court, the constitutional power to terminate
the 1954 Treaty was not shared by the President with the Senate or
the Congress. 35 Although it agreed that the plaintiffs had suffered
injury in fact so as to have standing, 36 the court concluded that Presi28 481 F. Supp. at 962. In the court's opinion, "[i]t would be incompatible with our system
of checks and balances if the executive power in the area of foreign affairs were construed to
encompass a unilateral power to terminate treaties." Id. at 963.
29 id. at 962. This is consonant with the generally accepted view that the President is the
sole representative of the nation in its relations with foreign countries. See United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
30 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
31 Id. art. I, § 1.
32 481 F. Supp. at 962.
33 Id. at 964-65 & 964-65 nn.67-69. The potential impact of this. decision on possible and
permissible mechanisms for termination of the proposed SALT II agreement now before the
Senate, has been noted. See Taiwan Suit Ruling on Appeal Amid Warnings, 65 A.B.A.J. 1631
(1979).
4 Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979), vacated and
remanded to dismiss complaint, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979). The court of appeals lacked the majority
necessary to dispose of the appeal on the threshold questions of standing and justiciability. Id.
35Id. at 12-20.
36 Id. at 9-12. In finding injury in fact, the court viewed President Carter's unilateral notice
of intention to terminate the Treaty as a disenfranchisement; "'a complete nullification or withdrawal of a voting opportunity." Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
Examining the standing issue in a separate concurring opinion, Judges Wright and Tamm
voted for reversal on the belief that the plaintiffs lacked a sufficient personal stake in the outcome so as to present an article III "case or controversy." Id. at 1-11 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
The concurring judges explained that an allegation of injury to a voting opportunity traditionally
had been considered insufficient to constitute injury in fact. Id. at 5. See Reuss v. Balles, 584
F.2d 461, 466-68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d
190, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Rather, in order to have standing, a legislator had to show nullification of a vote already cast. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246, slip op. at 6 & n.5 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 30, 1979) (Wright, C.J., concurring), vacated and remanded to dismiss complaint, 100 S.
Ct. 533 (1979). See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see Goldwater v.
Carter, No. 78-2412, slip op. at 10 n.12 (D.D.C. June 6, 1979), reopened at 481 F. Supp. 949
(D.D.C. 1979).
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dent Carter had acted constitutionally when he issued his unilateral
37
notice of termination.
The appellate court founded its holding, inter alia, upon article
X of the Treaty. 38 The article provides that "[e]ither Party may terminate . . . one year after notice has been given to the other
Party." 3 9 In the opinion of the appellate court, it was significant that
the Senate had ratified the Treaty with such a termination clause
without reserving any role for itself in the actual termination process. 40 For this reason, the court held that "the President's authority
as Chief Executive is at its zenith when the Senate has consented to a
treaty that expressly provides for termination on one year's notice,
and the President's action is the giving of [that] notice." 4 1 After noting that the Senate had yet to take any decisive action in response to
the President's announcement since it could not agree whether Resolution 15 would have retrospective effect, 4 2 the appellate court de43
termined that the Treaty would terminate on January 1, 1980.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Goldwater v. Carter, 44 granted the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari on December 13,
1979, and rendered its decision without oral argument. 45 A divided
Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the
matter to the district court with directions to dismiss the complaint. 4 6 A plurality of the Court believed that President Carter's
actions with regard to the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty constituted a
47
political, nonjusticiable question.

37 Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246, slip op. at 4, 25 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979), vacated
and remanded to dismiss complaint, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979).
3' See note 7 supra. In all, the circuit court enumerated ten grounds for reversal. Goldwater
v. Carter, No. 79-2246, slip op. at 12-23 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979), vacated and remanded to
dismiss complaint, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979). while expressly declining to consider whether or not
the presence of the termination clause was dispositive, the court did view it to be "of central
significance." Id. at 23.
39 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954, United StatesRepublic of China on Taiwan, 6 U.S.T. 433, 437, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
40 Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246, slip op. at 3-4, 24 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979), vacated
and remanded to dismiss complaint, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979).
41 Id. at 23. See note 31 supra.
42 Id. at 4. See note 20 supra.
43 Id. at 12.
44 100 S.Ct. 533 (1979).
45 Id.
4 Id. at 538 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In the opinion of the Court, this procedural disposition was necessary so that the lower courts' decisions on what was in reality a nonjusticiable
question would not " 'spawn any legal consequences.' ""Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting
United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 41 (1950)).
47 100 S. Ct. at 536 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Rehnquist, relied
heavily upon the prior Court decision in Coleman v. Miller.48 In
Coleman, the Court was asked to consider whether the Kansas State
Senate constitutionally, could ratify the Child Labor Amendment after
it previously had voted to reject it. 49 The amendment had been
proposed by Congress to undercut Hammer v. Dagenhart50 and
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,51 wherein the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional congressional attempts to regulate child labor. The
Coleman Court held that whether the amendment had been duly
ratified presented a political question. 52 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court deemed it important that the Constitution only delineates
the procedure for ratification of amendments, but is mute as to rejec53
tion.
Justice Rehnquist noted that the Constitution similarly delineates
the roles of the executive and legislative branches in treaty formation,
but is mute as to the process for treaty termination. 54 Due to the
lack of constitutional guidance, and the fact that unique termination
mechanisms might obtain for each and every treaty, the plurality concluded that the controversy " 'must surely be controlled by political
standards.' "55 As a further justification for its holding of nonjusticiability, the plurality voiced its concern that since the case also
touched upon the area of foreign relations, judicial intervention might
constitute an impermissible intrusion into the President's foreign af56
fairs power.
Although he concurred in the dismissal of the complaint because
he did not deem the controversy to be ripe for judicial review, Justice Powell strongly attacked the plurality's reliance upon the political
question doctrine. 5 7 In a separate opinion, Justice Powell stressed
Id. at 536-37 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
49 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
50 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
48

51 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
52 307 U.S. at 450.
53 Id. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
54 100 S.Ct. at 537 (Rehnquist, J.,concurring). See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
55 100 S. Ct. at 537 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291,

1302 (N.D. Ill. 1975)).
56 Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
57 100 S. Ct. at 533 (Powell, J., concurring). According to Justice Powell, the controversy was not sufficiently ripe for judicial review, and would not be so until the parties
reached "a constitutional impasse." Id.at 534. Referring to the status of Senate Resolution 15,
he concluded that since the Congress had not seen fit to challenge the President's actions, it
was not the Court's province to do so. Id. However, Justice Powell seems to have misinterpreted the effect of legislation such as Senate Resolution 15. See note 10 supra.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:243

that the amendments at issue in Coleman v. Miller, if ratified, would
have reversed prior Court decisions. 58 Since judicial review of the
efficacy of the State Senate's ratification would have placed the Court
in a position to mold "the very constitutional process used to reverse
Supreme Court decisions," 9 prudential considerations weighed
against judicial intervention. 6 ° The Justice did not discern any such
considerations in Goldwater v. Carter.6 1
Addressing the plurality's concern with judicial intrusion into the
President's conduct of United States foreign relations, Justice Powell
stated " 'it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.' "62 Rather
than involving judicial review of, or intrusion into the President's
conduct of foreign relations, he concluded that the question presented was only one of allocation of constitutional authority between
the executive and legislative branches. 63 As Justice Powell noted, the
Court readily has resolved such questions of authority on other occa64
sions.
A discussion of the plurality holding in Goldwater requires an
analysis of Baker v. Carr,65 the Court's most authoritative statement
of the political question doctrine and nonjusticiability. From the various analytical threads comprising the doctrine, the Baker Court delineated essentially three tests which would characterize a question as
"political": whether resolution of the issue involves questions textually
committed by the Constitution, demonstrably or by reasonable inference, 6 6 to a coordinate political branch; whether resolution of the
issue involves judicially unmanageable standards; and, whether resolution of the issue would entail -various prudential considerations which
67
counsel against judicial intervention.

58 100 S. Ct. at 536 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying

text.
59 100 S. Ct. at 536 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
60 Id. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517, 589 (1966).
61 100 S. Ct. at 536 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).

Id. at 535 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 364 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
63 Id. See note 25 supra.
64 100 S. Ct. at 536 (Powell, J., concurring). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
65 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Interestingly, the plurality opinion did not cite this landmark case.
66 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7-9
62

(1959).
67 369 U.S. at 217. For a detailed discussion of the Court's political question practice, see
Scharpf, supra note 60.
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A close reading of Baker indicates that the Court perceived the
"textual commitment" test to be of primary importance, since it justified the political question doctrine as an extension of the federal
separation of powers. 6 8 Indeed, as Justice Douglas pointed out in his
separate opinion, when the determination of an issue has been entrusted constitutionally to a coordinate branch, "the federal judiciary
does not intervene." 6 9 The Baker Court recognized, however, that
since the Court is the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution," it
"cannot reject as [a political question] a bona fide controversy as to
whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds [whatever au70
thority has been committed]."
Cases involving United States foreign relations commonly are
cited as examples of judicial abstention because the issues presented
were political questions. 7 1 Nonetheless, a survey of the Court's
abstention practice in this area reveals that the questions actually
labelled "political" were, finding constitutional authority to exist,
whether the actions of the executive or legislative branches were
within the limits of that textually committed authority. 72 That is,
though " 'the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of the
foreign affairs power is not subject to judicial review or decision,' "73
the Court has not abstained from reviewing whether the legislative or
executive branches had constitutional authority to act in the first
place. 74 For example, the Court has utilized the political question
doctrine with respect to presidential decisions regarding which political faction represents the government of a foreign state, 75 and which
[the Presnation has sovereignty over disputed territory, 76 "because
77
ident] had made decisions that were [his] to make."

68 369 U.S. at 210. See R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 327

(1974).
69 369 U.S. at 246 (Douglas, J., concurring).
70 369 U.S. at 211, 217. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). In

Marbury, Justice Marshall queried: "[t]o what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose
is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those
intended to be restrained?" Id. at 176.
71 See L. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 210-16.
72 Id. at 449 n.26 and accompanying text.
73 369 U.S. at 211 n.31 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).

74 As Professor Henkin has noted: "[The Court must review] whether the political branches
of government . .. have exceeded constitutional limitations; as long as they act within their
constitutional powers, the desirability or wisdom of what they do is a 'political question.' " L.
HENKIN, supra note 27, at 449 n.26. See id. at 449.
75 See, e.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
76 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
77 L. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 214.
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Unlike most cases involving foreign policy, the issue in Goldwater did not involve the propriety of President Carter's actions in the
exercise of his foreign affairs power. 78 Significantly, President Carter
did not justify his termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty
with his undisputed authority to recognize, or withdraw recognition
from, foreign governments. 7 9 In cases where such authority was invoked, the Court has acknowledged that the President has an implied
"[plower to remove . . . obstacles to full recognition [of foreign
governments]," '8 0 and that the exercise of such textually committed
power is judicially non-reviewable. 81 In this instance, President Carter chose to assert independent constitutional authority to terminate
the Treaty pursuant to its terms. 8 2
If the plurality's application of the political question doctrine
rested upon the "textual commitment" test, it would be true, as Justice Powell asserted, that the Court should have reviewed the issue
whether President Carter had constitutional authority to terminate
the 1954 Treaty. 83 It seems, however, that Justice Powell misinterpreted the plurality's application of the doctrine. This is apparent
from the fact that, in discussing the "confusion" inherent in the
plurality opinion, the Justice set forth a hypothetical in which the
President had unilaterally enacted a treaty despite prior Senate disapproval. 84 Justice Powell felt that the plurality's logic would lend
itself to declare such a situation nonjusticiable, "even though Art. II,
§ 2, clearly would resolve the dispute"8 5 by textual commitment.
Despite some confusing language which may have lead to Justice
Powell's misunderstanding, the Goldwater plurality actually rested its
holding not upon the "textual commitment" test, but rather upon the
"lack of judicially manageable standards" test of the political question

See note 25 supra. See also Scharpf, supra note 60, at 585.
slip op. at 3 n.2 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979),
vacated and remanded to dismiss complaint, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979). See also United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
80 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
81 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938); Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) ("Who is the sovereign, dejure or defacto, of a territory is not
a judicial, but a political question ..
"). See also L. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 214.
82 See Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246, slip op. at 3 n.2 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979),
vacated and remanded to dismiss complaint, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979).
83 As several commentators have noted, the Court has never decided that a constitutional
power struggle between the executive and legislative branches is nonjusticiable. See R.
BERGER, supra note 68, at 332. See also Scharpf, supra note 60, at 542.
84 100 S. Ct. at 535 (Powell, J., concurring).
85 Id. (Powell, J., concurring). See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
78

79 See Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246,
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doctrine. Specifically, the plurality opinion found support for its holding of nonjusticiability in the total absence of constitutional guidance
on treaty termination, and the fact that unique mechanisms might
obtain for each and every treaty. 8 6 Citing Dyer v. Blair,87 the plurality concluded that " '[a] question that might be answered in different ways for different [treaties] must surely be controlled by political
standards rather than standards easily characterized as judicially manageable.' "88
Given this disposition of the case, it is quite confusing why the
Goldwater plurality discussed its concern with judicial intervention
into the area of foreign affairs. 8 9 Indeed, the opening sentence of the
plurality opinion, which reads "I am of the view that the basic question presented . . . in this case is 'political' . . . because it involves
the authority of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign
relations," 90 leads one to believe that this is the actual holding of the
case. President Carter, however, did not even assert the power, incident to his foreign affairs power, to recognize or withdraw recognition
from foreign governments. 9 1 More importantly, to correctly invoke
the political question doctrine under the "textual commitment" test,
the Court would in effect be saying that the President had made a
decision that was his to make. 9 2 Given the Court's disposition of
Goldwater, it is evident that the Court did not intend the Constitution to be so interpreted.
Goldwater v. Carter, therefore, does not represent the first "textual commitment" case in which the Court refused to decide a question of constitutional power, although Justice Powell asserted otherwise. To the contrary, the Goldwater Court was presented with a
unique and problematical case in that, not only was the Constitution totally silent as to the proper procedure for treaty termination,
but also that different termination mechanisms might exist for each

86 100 S. Ct. at 537 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In light of the actual grounds for application
of the political question doctrine, the plurality's concern with intruding into the President's
conduct of our foreign relations policy seems misplaced and confusing. Such concern seems to
lend itself more to the "textual commitment" test. See text accompanying notes 71-77, supra.
87 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. I11.
1975).
88 100 S. Ct. at 537 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291.
1302 (N.D. I11.
1975)).
89 100 S. Ct. at 536-37 (Rehnquist, J.,concurring).
9o Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
91 See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text.
92 See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
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and every treaty. Since there is no constitutional standard to guide
judicial intervention, the Court peculiarly found itself unable to "[s]ay
93
what the law is."
Vincent John Paluzzi

93 Marburv v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). See Field, The Doctrine of
Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REv. 485, 511 (1924). "[T]he court must
have some rule to follow before it can operate . . . [w]here no rules exist, the court is powerless
to act." Id.

